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ABSTRACT 
The efficiency of automated multi-issue negotiation depends on 
the availability and quality of knowledge about an opponent. We 
present a generic framework based on Bayesian learning to learn 
an opponent model, i.e. the issue preferences as well as the issue 
priorities  of  an  opponent.  The  algorithm  proposed  is  able  to 
effectively  learn  opponent  preferences  from  bid  exchanges  by 
making  some  assumptions  about  the  preference  structure  and 
rationality  of  the  bidding  process.  The  assumptions  used  are 
general  and  consist  among  others  of  assumptions  about  the 
independency of issue preferences and the topology of functions 
that are used to model such preferences. Additionally, a rationality 
assumption  is  introduced  that  assumes  that  agents  use  a 
concession-based  strategy.  It  thus  extends  and  generalizes 
previous  work  on  learning  in  negotiation  by  introducing  a 
technique to learn an opponent model for multi-issue negotiations. 
We present experimental results demonstrating the effectiveness 
of our approach and discuss an approximation algorithm to ensure 
scalability of the learning algorithm. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence 
– intelligent agents, multi-agent systems.  
General Terms 
Algorithms, Performance, Economics, Experimentation, Theory. 
Keywords 
Automated  Multi-Issue  Negotiation,  Opponent  Modelling, 
Preference Profiles, Bayesian Learning. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  bilateral  negotiation,  two  parties  aim  at  reaching  a  joint 
agreement. They do so by exchanging various offers or bids using 
e.g.  an  alternating  offers  protocol  [11]  called  the  “negotiation 
dance” in [11]. In reaching such an agreement both parties usually 
aim to satisfy their own interests as best as possible, but have to 
take their opponent’s preferences into account as well to reach an 
agreement at all. This is complicated, by the fact that negotiating 
parties  are  generally  not  willing  to  reveal  their  preferences  in 
order  to  avoid  exploitation.  As  a  result,  both  parties  have 
incomplete information which makes it hard to decide on a good 
negotiation move and hard to reach an optimal agreement.  
Research has demonstrated that human negotiators may feel 
they did well in a negotiation but also shows that the results of 
untrained negotiators are in general suboptimal [1]. One reason 
for  this  is  the  limited  computing  abilities  of  humans  when 
confronted  with  multiple  issues  that  are  negotiated.  Software 
agents  can  outperform  humans  in  well-defined  negotiation 
domains  [7].  However,  in  general  such  agents  cannot  reach 
optimal outcomes either without sufficient knowledge about the 
negotiation  domain  or  their  opponents.  As  negotiation  is 
recognized as an important means for agents to achieve their own 
goals  efficiently  [12]  the  challenge  thus  is  to  maximize  the 
performance  of  automated negotiation agents given this limited 
availability of information. 
Various  options  for  improving  the  performance  of 
negotiating  agents  have  been  outlined  in  the  literature.  The 
performance of a negotiating agent is to a large extent determined 
by  the  strategy  used  for  proposing  offers.  Typically,  in  the 
automated negotiation literature concession-based strategies have 
been proposed. A concession-based strategy proposes as a next 
offer a bid that has a decreased utility compared to the previously 
proposed offer. An example of such a strategy, which does not use 
any domain or opponent knowledge, is the ABMP strategy [6]. 
The  ABMP  strategy  decides  on  a  negotiation  move  based  on 
considerations derived from the agent’s own utility space only. 
Such  a  strategy cannot search through the negotiation outcome 
space for outcomes that are mutually beneficial for both parties 
and thus is not always able to reach so-called win-win outcomes 
[11]. The ABMP strategy will therefore most likely be inefficient 
in complex negotiation domains although it has been shown to 
outperform humans in small domains [1]. 
A natural suggestion then is to try and incorporate additional 
knowledge into a negotiating agent to improve its performance. 
The  effectiveness  of  providing knowledge about the domain of 
negotiation  has  been  demonstrated  in  the  Trade-off  strategy 
introduced  in  [5].  In  particular,  this  paper  shows  that  domain 
knowledge (coded as so-called similarity functions) can be used to 
select bids that are close to an opponent’s bids, thus increasing the 
likelihood of acceptance of a proposed bid by that opponent. In 
this approach, the knowledge represented by similarity functions 
is  assumed  to  be  public.  As  is  to  be  expected,  if  similarity 
functions  can  be  found,  the  Trade-off  strategy  outperforms  a 
concession-based  strategy  such  as  ABMP  [3].  Incorporating 
public domain knowledge into a strategy, however, still does not 
take  into  account  the  private  preferences  or  priorities  that  an 
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331opponent associates with negotiated issues. The more knowledge 
of these preferences is available the better the chance of win-win 
scenarios and optimal outcomes. 
The  private  preferences  of  an  agent  will  not  simply  be 
revealed to an opponent. For example, generally it is unwise to 
reveal  information  about  what  is  minimally  acceptable  (your 
reservation price) since this will provide an opponent with the 
opportunity to force this outcome [11]. If the negotiating parties 
have a sufficient amount of trust in each other, some information 
might be volunteered. Humans might also offer feedback about 
the bids received from the opponent (e.g., your last bid is actually 
worse than your previous bid). If no information is offered freely, 
an alternative to obtain information about an opponent’s private 
preferences is to derive it from the negotiation moves performed 
by  that  opponent  during  a  negotiation.  Various  learning 
techniques  have  been  proposed  to  uncover  such  private 
preferences [2, 5, 6, 13]. A complicating factor in this context is 
that  the  number  of  moves  performed  before  reaching  an 
agreement  is  limited  (typically  about  5  to  30  moves),  and 
individual bids do not provide much information [14]. 
In  this  paper,  we  show  that  it  is  nonetheless  possible  to 
construct  an  opponent  model,  i.e.  a  model  of  the  opponent’s 
preferences, that can be effectively used to improve negotiation 
outcomes. We provide a generic framework for learning both the 
preferences  associated  with issue values as well as the weights 
that rank the importance of issues to an agent. The main idea is to 
exploit certain structural features and rationality principles to limit 
the  possible  set  of  preference  profiles  that  can  be  learned.  We 
present  a  learning  algorithm  based  on  Bayesian  learning 
techniques that uses assumptions about the structure of opponent 
preferences and the rationality of the bidding process itself. Our 
approach  can  be  integrated  into  various  negotiation  strategies 
since the main focus is on learning an opponent’s utility space. 
The  framework  allows  for  the  incorporation  of  prior  available 
opponent knowledge but does not require any such knowledge. It 
thus  extends  and  generalizes  previous  work  on  learning  in 
negotiation  by  introducing  a  technique  to  learn  opponent 
preferences for multi-issue negotiation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
discusses  related  work  in  the  area  of  opponent  modelling.  In 
Section  3  the  approach  for  learning  an  opponent  model  is 
introduced  and  the  structural  and  rationality  assumptions  that 
enable  such  learning  are  explained.  Section  4  presents 
experimental  results  to  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  the 
approach.  In  Section  5  the  learning  algorithm is presented and 
additional techniques are introduced to manage the computational 
complexity of the learning algorithm. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
the paper and suggests several directions for future research. 
2.  RELATED WORK 
Previous  research  analyzing  various  negotiation  domains  and 
algorithms, see e.g. [3, 5, 14], has shown that efficient negotiation 
requires both knowledge about the negotiation domain as well as 
about opponent preferences. In particular, some idea of what the 
opponent  preferences  are  like  is  required  to  avoid  so-called 
unfortunate steps in which a bid is proposed that is worse for both 
parties than one of the previous bids [3]. Related work in the area 
of opponent modelling in negotiation has resulted in a variety of 
approaches  that  usually  focus  on  learning  one  aspect  of  the 
negotiation process, such as learning the opponent’s reservation 
point [13], issue priorities (typically weights are used to model the 
relative  importance  of  each  issue;  [2,  6]),  or  the  negotiation 
strategy itself [8]. This is only natural given the limited amount of 
evidence that can be used to learn from in a single negotiation. 
In order to position our own work, we discuss its relation to 
that  of  others.  In  [8]  an  approach  to  learn  an  opponent’s 
negotiation strategy as a sequence of bids made by that party is 
presented.  The  approach  uses  Markov  chains  to  model  the 
opponent  strategy  and  Bayesian  learning  to  update  the 
probabilities of the transitions between states in the Markov chain. 
It does assume, however, that negotiations involve only one issue. 
Automated learning of a negotiation strategy is hard and is only 
feasible using data from multiple, successive negotiations. In this 
paper we do not attempt to learn a negotiation strategy but instead 
assume  an  opponent  uses  some  form  of  concession-based 
strategy. The framework we present is able to learn multi-issue 
preferences during a single negotiation. 
In  [5]  a  model  is  presented  that  incorporates  domain 
knowledge for deciding on a negotiation move. This approach is 
extended in [2], which proposes to use kernel density estimation 
(KDE) to learn the issue priorities (weights) of an opponent. The 
basic framework modelling issue preferences by means of domain 
knowledge remains intact but is complemented to learn private 
issue priorities. We use the same structure of preference profiles, 
which allows for arbitrary sets of issue values and assumes that 
issues are independent [11]. In our approach, however, both issue 
priorities as well as preferences over issue values can be learned. 
Our  framework  also  allows  for  the  incorporation  of  available 
domain knowledge before a negotiation is started. 
Our  approach  is  most  related  to  work  based  on  Bayesian 
learning. An interesting approach to opponent modelling is that of 
learning some of the parameters of an opponent strategy [13]. The 
opponent modelling proposed by [13] uses the Bayesian update 
rule  to  learn  an  opponent’s  reservation  point  in  one-issue 
negotiation. In [7] an opponent profile is learned in a qualitative 
negotiation  setting.  It  is  assumed  that  a  fixed  set  of  possible 
opponent  profiles  is  given.  Bayesian  learning  then  is  used  to 
determine the likelihood that an opponent has one of these given 
profiles. The profile types are assumed to be public knowledge 
and an agent only has to learn which type of profile its opponent 
most likely has. Our approach to learning opponent preferences is 
also  based  on  Bayesian  learning  but  we  introduce  a  general 
learning algorithm that is able to learn both issue preferences as 
well as issue priorities in a multi-issue negotiation and enables the 
learning  of  opponent  preference  profiles  that  have  not  been 
previously fixed. 
3.  LEARNING AN OPPONENT MODEL 
Our goal is to introduce a learning approach that can be used to 
model an opponent in a negotiation with imperfect information. In 
this sense, negotiation can be viewed as an instance of a Bayesian 
game. In game theory, the class of Bayesian games refers to games 
in which players do not have complete information about each 
others’ preferences (or types) [11]. In such a setting, players can 
use evidence (or so-called signal functions) to update their beliefs 
about the other party. In a Bayesian game, in order to be able to 
learn,  it  is  necessary  to  specify  the  strategy  spaces  and  type 
spaces.  Ideally,  these  spaces  are  defined  generically  enough  to 
allow learning of a rich variety of opponent profiles. At the same 
time,  however,  these  spaces  should  not  be  so  rich  to  make  it 
impossible to learn an opponent profile from the limited available 
332evidence (in our case, the opponent’s bids). In this section, we 
present the hypothesis space that defines the range of opponent 
profiles  that  can  be  learned.  We  do  so  by  introducing  various 
reasonable assumptions about the structure of opponent profiles 
as  well  as  about  an  opponent’s  negotiation  strategy.  These 
assumptions  are  introduced  to  ensure  the  task  of  learning  an 
opponent model is feasible. In Section 4 we present evidence that 
the proposed model is both effective as well as rich enough to 
learn opponent preferences in various negotiation domains. 
3.1  Structural Assumptions 
Our first assumption is a common one, see e.g., [11], and assumes 
that the utility of a bid can be computed as a weighted sum of the 
utilities associated with the values for each issue. Utility functions 
modelling the preferences of an agent thus are linearly additive 
functions and are defined by a set of weights wi (or priorities) and 
corresponding evaluation functions ei(xi) for each of n issues by: 
∑
=
∈ =
n
i
t i i i t b x e w b u
1
) ( ) (     (1) 
where xi is the value of issue i in bid bt in the negotiation round t. 
To ensure that a utility function has a range in [0, 1], the range of 
the evaluation functions is assumed to be in [0,1] and the weights 
are assumed to be normalized such that their sum equals 1. 
In order to learn an opponent’s preference profile or utility 
function U(b) we need to learn both the issue priorities or weights 
wi  as  well  as  the  evaluation  functions  ei(xi).  The  objective  of 
learning an opponent model thus is to find a model as defined by 
(1) that is the most plausible candidate or best approximation of 
the opponent’s preference profile. 
Our  next  assumption  concerns  the  issue  priorities  in  a 
preference profile (1). Some knowledge about issue priorities is 
important in order to be able to propose a trade-off on issues that 
are valued differently by negotiating parties. In [3] it is shown that 
in  general  it  is  not  sufficient  to  know  issue  preferences,  i.e. 
evaluation functions ei(xi), to be able to make trade-offs. Trade-
offs are an important means to get closer to the Pareto efficient 
frontier. To be able to propose a trade-off an agent must know at 
least two issues one of which is valued more by itself than its 
opponent  and  one  which  is  more  valued  by the opponent than 
itself.  In  that  case,  an  agent  can  make  a concession on a less-
valued issue that is valued more by its opponent and propose an 
issue value that is more highly valued by the agent itself.  
In [5] it is argued that it is typically sufficient to know the 
ranking  of  the  weights  to  be  able  to  make  trade-offs  and 
significantly increase the efficiency of an outcome. We propose to 
define the set of hypotheses H
w about the private weights of an 
opponent as the set of all possible rankings of weights. It is then 
straightforward  to  associate  real-valued  numbers  again  with  a 
hj∈H
w about weights, which can be computed as a linear function 
of the rank and also ensures weights are normalized, as follows: 
( ) 1
2
+
=
n n
r
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where ri
j
 is the rank of weight wi in the hypothesis hj and n is the 
number of issues. 
Finally, we need to impose some additional structure on the 
evaluation  functions  in  order  to  be  able  to  learn  a  preference 
profile.  To  facilitate  the  learning  of  an  opponent’s  preferences 
over issue values we introduce a hypothesis space of predefined 
function  types.  A  third  assumption  thus  concerns  the  shape  of 
evaluation functions and we assume that preferences over issue 
values can be modelled by means of three types of functions: 
-  downhill shape: minimal issue values are preferred over other 
issue    values  (think,  e.g., of price and delivery time for a 
buying agent), and the evaluation of issue values decreases 
linearly when the value of the issue increases; 
-  uphill shape: maximal issue values are preferred over other 
issue  values  (think,  e.g.,  of  price  and  delivery  time  for  a 
selling agent), and the evaluation of issue values increases 
linearly when the value of the issue increases; 
-  triangular  shape:  a  specific  issue  value  somewhere  in  the 
issue range is valued most and evaluations associated with 
issues to the left (“smaller”) and right (“bigger”) of this issue 
value linearly decrease (think, e.g., of an amount of goods). 
Figure  1  below  illustrates  this  set  of  functions  and  introduces 
labels h
e
i,j to refer to the hypothesis that issue i has associated 
evaluation function j.  
 
Figure 1. Hypothesis space of possible evaluation functions. 
The  three  function  types  that  define  the  range  of  possible 
evaluation  functions  are  common  in  the  literature,  and,  most 
importantly, in combination allow for the modelling of other types 
of function as well (see Figure 2 below). 
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Figure 2. Approximation of an evaluation function that is not in 
the hypothesis space by means of two evaluation functions. 
In order to see this, it should be taken into account that a 
probability distribution is associated with each hypothesis. This 
allows other types of functions to be approximated by associating 
different  probabilities  with  various  hypotheses.  The  predicted 
evaluation of an issue value is derived from all hypotheses that are 
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333assigned  a  non-zero  probability.  The  evaluation  thus  can  be 
viewed as computing a most probable evaluation value of an issue 
value  by  computing  the  weighted  sum  of  all  evaluations  of  an 
issue  value  associated  with  some  hypothesis  with  non-zero 
probability.  Different  probability  distributions  thus  allow  for 
approximating different types of evaluation functions that do not 
need to match any single evaluation function from the hypothesis 
space. Figure 2 shows an example of the approximation of a more 
complex evaluation function (solid line) that is not present in the 
hypothesis space. Many complex evaluation functions thus can be 
successfully  approximated  by  a  composition  of  several  simple 
evaluation functions from the hypothesis space. The preferences 
of an agent can be viewed as a membership function that assigns a 
degree of membership to each hypothesis in the hypothesis space 
similar  to  membership  in  fuzzy  set  theory.  In  our  case  the 
membership of an evaluation function is modelled as a probability 
distribution  and  our  approach  is  similar  to  that  of  triangular 
membership functions [9]. 
To  summarize,  the  set  of  hypotheses  concerning  an 
opponent’s  preference  profile  is  a  Cartesian  product  of  the 
hypotheses about issue weights H
w and shapes of issue evaluation 
functions H
e
i: H = H
w×H
e
1×H
e
2×…×H
e
n. 
3.2  Rationality Assumptions 
The  idea  is  to  learn  an  opponent  preference  profile  from  its 
negotiation moves, i.e. the bids it proposes during a negotiation. 
In a Bayesian learning approach, this means we need to be able to 
update the probability associated with all hypotheses given new 
evidence, i.e. one of the bids. More precisely, we want to compute 
P(hj|bt) where bt is the bid proposed at time t. In order to be able 
to use Bayes’ rule to do this, however, we need some information 
about the utility the opponent associates with bid bt. 
As  this  information  is  not  generally  available,  we  need  to 
introduce  an  additional  assumption  to  be  able  to  make  an 
educated  guess  of  the  utility  value  of  bt  for  an  opponent.  The 
assumption that we need is that our opponent follows a more or 
less  rational  strategy  in  proposing  bids.  In  particular,  we  will 
assume that an opponent follows some kind of concession-based 
strategy. Although assuming such behaviour may not always be 
realistic  it  typically  is  necessary  to  perform  at  least  some 
concession  steps  in  order  to  reach  an  agreement.  Moreover,  in 
game-theoretic  approaches  and  in  negotiation  it  is  commonly 
assumed that agents use a concession-based strategy [4, 10]. 
 
Figure 3. Conditional probability distribution of tactics. 
In line with [4] we assume that a rational agent uses a time-
dependent tactics (TDT). In line with such a strategy it starts with 
a bid of maximal utility and moves towards its reservation value 
when approaching the negotiation deadline. Thus, it is assumed 
that an agent’s tactics during a negotiation can be defined by a 
monotonically decreasing function. This assumption still allows 
that  an  opponent  uses  various  kinds  of  tactics  and  no  exact 
knowledge  about  an  opponent’s  negotiation  tactics  is  assumed. 
More  specifically,  the  rationality  assumption  is  modelled  as  a 
probability  distribution  associated  with  a  range  of  tactics  (see 
Figure 3); as a result, each utility associated with an opponent’s 
bid thus also has an associated probability. 
In  this  paper  we  use  linear  functions  to  estimate  the  
predicted utility value: u’(bt) = 1-0.05·t. This assumption allows 
us to compute the conditional probability P(bt|hj) representing the 
probability of bid bt given hypothesis hj at time t. This is done by 
defining  the  probability  distribution  P(bt|hj)  over  the  predicted 
utility of bt using the rationality assumption and the utility of bt 
according  to  hypothesis  hj  (see  Figure  3).  Here  the  predicted 
utility u’(bt) of a next bid of the opponent is estimated as u’(bt-1)-
c(t) using a function c(t) that is the most plausible model of the 
negotiation concession tactic used by the opponent. We use the 
following function to model the conditional distribution, where 
u(bt|hj) is the utility of bid bt according to the hypothesis hj: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2
'
2
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j t e h b P
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−
=         (2) 
This  probability  distribution  can  be  used  consecutively  to 
update  the  probabilities of the hypotheses using Bayes’ rule to 
compute P(hj|bt). 
The  spread  σ  of  the  conditional  distribution  used  in  (2) 
defines the certainty of the agent about its opponent’s negotiation 
tactics. If an agent is certain about the utility of an opponent’s bid 
bt then σ can be set to a low value. A higher level of certainty 
increases  the  learning  speed,  since  hypotheses  predicting  an 
incorrect utility value of a bid in that case would get assigned an 
increasingly lower probability, and vice versa. Overestimating the 
level  of  certainty,  however,  may  lead  to  incorrect  results,  and 
some care should to be taken to assign the right value to σ. 
3.3  Bayesian Learning Approach 
The framework for learning introduced above can now be applied. 
In  order  to  do  so,  the  first  step  to  perform  is  to  initialize  the 
probability distribution associated with each of the hypotheses in 
the  hypothesis  space  H  introduced  in  Section  3.1.  This  means 
either assigning a probability distribution to hypotheses based on 
available knowledge about opponent preferences, or, if no such a 
priori knowledge is available, to assign a uniform distribution. 
During a negotiation at every time t when a new bid bt is 
received  from  the  opponent  the  probability  of  each  hypothesis 
should be updated using Bayes’ rule: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ∑
=
= m
k
k t k
j t j
t j
h b P h P
h b P h P
b h P
1
 
Here the conditional probability P(bt|hj) represents the probability 
that bid bt  might have been proposed given hypothesis hj  (using 
the predicted utility according to rationality assumption (2)) and 
P(hj) is the current probability of hypothesis hj. The normalization 
factor  in  the  denominator  of  Bayes’  rule  ensures  that  the 
probability of the entire hypothesis space is 1. 
0 
P(b0|hj) 
P(b1|hj) 
P(b2|hj) 
P(bt|hj) 
u’(b1)  u’(b2)  u’(b0) u(bt|hj) 
334The learning approach outlined will increase the probability 
of  a  hypothesis  about  an  opponent’s  preference  profile  that  is 
most consistent with the bid sequence received so far from that 
opponent and provides the best match with the utilities of these 
bids,  estimated  using  the  conditional  probability  distribution 
associated  with  tactics.  As  a  result,  the  more  consistent  the 
predicted utility is with a hypothesis, the higher the probability 
associated with this hypothesis will be. It is possible that several 
hypotheses  predict  (almost)  the  same  utilities  for  a  given  bid 
sequence,  but  this  simply  means  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
distinguish  different  preference  profiles  based  upon  that  bid 
sequence and more evidence would be needed to do so. 
The  spread  of  the  probability  distribution  P(hj)  associated 
with the hypothesis space might also be used as a measure of the 
effectiveness  of  learning  the  opponent  model.  Presumably, 
successful  learning  of  an  opponent  model  will  increase  the 
probability  of  some  of  the  hypotheses  that  best  fit  the  bidding 
sequence  received  from  an  opponent  and  the  number  of 
hypotheses  still  considered  viable  would  decrease.  If  not,  the 
probability  distributions  P(hj)  would  remain  a  more  or  less 
uniform distribution. In the latter case the agent does not learn 
from  the  bids  exchanged  and  it  could  use  this  fact  in  the 
negotiation  strategy.  For  instance,  negotiating  against  an  eratic 
opponent that seems to more or less randomly propose bids, the 
agent might start using a Boulware strategy [4], in order to wait 
until an acceptable offer of the opponent is received. 
Finally, during a negotiation an agent can use the updated 
probability  distribution  to  compute  estimates  of  the  utility  of 
counteroffers it considers and choose one that e.g. maximizes the 
utility of its opponent, to increase the likelihood of acceptance by 
that opponent. The expected utility ū(bt) of a counteroffer bt may 
be  computed  as  follows,  where  wi  and  ei  are  the  weights 
respectively evaluation functions predicted by hypothesis hj∈H:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑
= =
∈ =
H
j
n
i
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4.  EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
In  this  section,  experiments  are  performed  to  show  the 
effectiveness of our approach to learn the opponent model and to 
use it to find a good counteroffer. The Bayesian learning agents 
used in the experiment update their opponent model each time a 
new bid is received from the opponent in line with the Bayesian 
learning approach introduced above. 
The strategy used by the Bayesian learning agents is based 
on the smart meta-strategy of [5]. The agent starts with proposing 
a  bid  that  has  maximal  utility  given  its  own  preferences.  Each 
consecutive turn the agent can either accept the opponent’s bid or 
send a counter-offer. The agent accepts a bid from its opponent 
when the utility of that bid is higher than the utility of its own last 
bid  or  the  utility  of  the  bid  it  would  otherwise  propose  next. 
Otherwise, the agent will propose a counter-offer. 
The  basic  idea  of  the  smart  meta-strategy  is  to  propose  a 
counter-offer that has the same utility (lies on the same utility iso-
curve) as the previous bid of the agent but improves the utility of 
the opponent whenever possible. Formally, the strategy searches 
for a bid bt+1 that satisfies, where uown denotes the agent’s own 
utility function and τ denotes a target utility: 
( ) { }
( ) b u b
x u x b
t
own δ τ ≤ − ∈
+ = max arg 1  
The set  ( ) { } δ τ ≤ − x u x own  represents the utility iso-curve that 
have  the  same  utility  for  the  agent,  (within  a  small  interval         
[τ-δ;τ+δ]) but might have different utilities for its opponent. The 
strategy  selects  a  bid  from  the  iso-curve  that  maximizes  the 
expected utility of the opponent. The bid bt+1 lies on the predicted 
Pareto frontier according to the current opponent model.  If it is 
not  possible  to  find  a  bid  that  thus  improves  the utility of the 
opponent, a concession step will be performed after performing 
smart steps (i.e. steps that stay on the same iso-curve and try to 
improve  the  next  bid  for  the  opponent  by  using  the  updated 
opponent  model).  The  agents  perform  a  concession  step  by 
decreasing  the  target  utility  τ  of  their  next  bid  by  a  fixed 
concession step c. 
Two  sets  of  experiments  were  run:  one  based  on  a 
negotiation domain with 5 issues taken from [8], and one based 
on a negotiation domain with 4 issues taken from [5]. To compare 
the  performance  of  the  Bayesian  learning  approach,  the  agents 
using opponent modelling were compared with agents using the 
Trade-off strategy and the ABMP strategy discussed in Section 2. 
Two variants of learning agents were tested: one with and one 
without initial domain knowledge; the first to compare with the 
Trade-off strategy which uses domain knowledge and the second 
to compare with the ABMP strategy which does not. All agents 
played  against  the  same  opponent,  which  used  the  Trade-off 
strategy, to be able to compare negotiation traces and results. 
4.1  Experimental Results 
In  the  first  domain,  the  setting  is  that  of  an  employee  and  an 
employer who negotiate about a job assignment and related issues 
such as salary. An interesting aspect of this domain is that both 
parties  have  the  same  preferences  with  regards  to  one  of  the 
issues. Figure 4 shows the results of the experiments, including 
the  resulting  negotiation  traces  as  well  as  the  Pareto  efficient 
frontier. The agreements reached are also marked explicitly. 
 
   
Figure 4. Employee-Employer negotiation domain. 
In this domain, the Bayesian agents very efficiently learn issue 
weights  when  they  are  provided  with  domain  knowledge, 
indicated by the fact that the negotiation trace almost coincides 
with the Pareto frontier. But even without domain knowledge the 
335Bayesian  agent  needs  little  time  to  learn  the  issue  evaluation 
functions and consecutively improves the weight estimations. The 
Trade-off  strategy,  which  uses  domain  knowledge  but  simply 
assumes  that issue priorities are uniformly distributed, makes a 
number of unfortunate steps in this domain due to the fact that 
different issues are important to each party. Finally, the ABMP 
strategy  is  clearly  outperformed  by  the strategy using Bayesian 
learning  and  almost  uniformly  concedes  on  all  issues  without 
considering the opponent’s weights. ABMP lacks the capability of 
trading-in less important issues for more important ones. Since the 
Trade-off  strategy  is  influenced  by  the  efficiency  of  the 
opponent’s  strategy,  it  moreover  performs  less  efficient  against 
the ABMP strategy. Note that only the Bayesian agents were able 
to reach an agreement close to the Pareto efficient frontier. 
Due to space limitations, we only provide the utilities of the 
agreements  reached  in  the  second  domain,  the Service-oriented 
negotiation (SON) domain from [5]. This domain has four issues, 
30 values each (810,000 possible outcomes) and preferences of 
both parties are strictly opposing on all issues. Table 1 shows the 
results, where the dealer role is varied and again, for comparison 
reasons, an agent using the Trade-Off strategy was used to play 
the  buyer  role.  The  negotiation  traces  do  not  add  much 
information  compared  to  the  previous  domain,  although  the 
Trade-off  strategy  performs  better  on  this  domain.  The  results 
provide evidence that the learning approach performs consistent 
over various domains. 
Utility of the outcome 
Strategy of Dealer 
Dealer  Buyer 
Bayesian with domain knowledge  0.83  0.76 
Bayesian  0.83  0.76 
Trade-Off  0.78  0.77 
ABMP  0.64  0.56 
Table 1. Negotiation outcomes in the SON domain. 
5.  SCALABLE LEARNING ALGORITHM 
In this section, the learning approach is refined and an outline of a 
scalable algorithm is discussed. The experimental results of the 
previous  section  clearly  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  the 
approach outlined in Section 3. Here our main concern will be the 
size of the hypothesis space H = H
w×H
e
1×H
e
2×…×H
e
n. This space 
is  exponential  in  the  number  of  issues  and  consists  of  n!⋅m
n 
hypotheses where m denotes the number of evaluation function 
hypotheses (see Figure 1). Clearly, even though the approach is 
very effective in small domains, it is not computationally feasible 
to update this many hypotheses in larger negotiation domains. In 
order to deal with larger domains, some additional independence 
assumptions will be introduced. As is to be expected, this will 
impact  the  performance  of  the  learning  algorithm,  but  we  will 
present additional experiments that show improved performance 
compared to that of the other strategies discussed here. 
To  enable  scaling  of  the  proposed  learning  approach  for 
negotiation  domains  of  high  dimensionality  it  will  be  assumed 
that  the  probability  of  individual  components  of  a  hypothesis 
h=〈h
w,  h
e
1,  …, h
e
n〉 about a complete preference profile can be 
learned  independently.  That  is,  it  will  be  assumed  that  weight 
ranking  hypotheses  h
w  and  the  shape  of  each  issue  evaluation 
function h
e
i can be learned independently from each other.  This is 
a reasonable approximation since each bid may be presumed to 
give  at  least  some  information  about  one  issue  relative  to  the 
available knowledge about the other issues. 
First, we will explain how each of the evaluation function 
hypotheses can be learned independently. The idea is illustrated in 
Figure 5. Figure 5(a) shows the approach outlined in Section 3 as 
a  Bayesian  network  whereas  Figure  5(b)  illustrates  how  the 
independence  assumption  can  be  exploited  to  split  up  each 
hypothesis  into  its  components  and  add  these  as  nodes  to  the 
network. To simplify the notation we assume that symbol h
e
i,j  can 
be applied to a bid as a function and results in an evaluation value 
of the bid according to the evaluation function of hypotheses j for 
the issue i.  The size of the local probability distribution table of 
each  hypothesis  in  the  original  approach  is  n!⋅m
n-1.  In  the 
approximation  method,  which  introduces  additional  nodes  for 
every hypothesis, the size of such a local probability distribution 
table  is  only  m.  Each  of  these  additional  nodes  represents  an 
expected value of the evaluation function for a given bid:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
=
⋅ =
m
j
t
e
j i
e
j i t
e
i b h h P b h
1
, ,
 
Second, we need to consider an approximation method for 
learning  weight  ranking  hypotheses.  Note  that  the  number  of 
possible weight orderings is n! which is prohibitive for large n. To 
reduce  the  number  of  weight  ranking  hypotheses  the 
normalization  requirement  associated  with  weights  is  relaxed. 
Instead of n! hypotheses a set of m hypotheses for each weight is 
introduced, where each hypothesis represents a possible value of 
the weight. Similar to the hypotheses for evaluation functions we 
introduce the symbol h
w
i,j to denote the hypothesis about the value 
of the weight for issue i according to hypothesis j, and will also 
sometimes use it to denote the value of the associated weight, i.e. 
h
w
1,1=0, h
w
1,2=0.1, h
w
1,3=0.2,…. Then, the expected value of an 
issue weight can be calculated as follows: 
( ) ;
1
, , ∑
=
⋅ =
m
j
w
j i
w
j i
w
i h h P h  
The nodes of expected values for evaluation functions and 
weights  are  used  to  update  local  probability  distributions  only. 
The expected utility of a bid bt is now calculated as follows: 
( ) ( ) t
n
i
e
j i
w
i t b h h b u ∑
=
⋅ =
1
,  
Since a utility function is assumed to be linearly additive this 
approximation of weight ranking hypotheses does not influence 
the selection of a bid that maximizes the opponent’s utility (when 
computing  a  counteroffer).  However,  the  approximation  may 
affect  the  prediction  of  the  utility  of  an  opponent’s  bid  thus 
influencing the quality of learning when updating the probability 
of  the  hypotheses  in  line  with  the  conditional  distribution 
associated with the opponent’s tactics. 
Now we proceed and show that this approximation solves the 
scalability problem. Note, that instead of normalizing probabilities 
over  complete  set  of  possible  utility  spaces  the  probability 
distribution over weights and evaluation functions are normalized 
for every issue: 
n i h P
m
j
w
j i ,..., 1 , 1 ) (
1
, = = ∑
=
 ;  n i h P
m
j
è
j i ,..., 1 , 1 ) (
1
, = = ∑
=
 
Taking this into account, we can show that the expected utility of 
a bid is the same as in the original approach when the same a 
priori probability distributions are used. The main idea concerns 
the  modification  of  the  learning  itself,  i.e.  the  update  of  the 
probabilities associated with hypotheses about single weights and
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      a              b 
Figure 5 – Bayesian network representing learning probabilities (a) over complete preference profiles hypotheses and over (b) individual 
hypotheses for weights and shapes of evaluation functions. 
 
evaluation  functions  of  single  issues.  Instead of calculating the 
probability distribution for a given hypothesis with respect to all 
possible partial opponent models we now use the best prediction 
(or  expected  value)  of  the  current  model.  In  other  words,  the 
probability distribution of a hypothesis is estimated by using the 
probability  distributions  provided  by  the  model  learned  so  far. 
The update of the probability of a hypothesis thus assumes that 
these  probability  distributions  of  other  hypotheses  yield  a 
reasonably good prediction of the opponent’s preferences. 
It  can  be  shown  that  if  this  is  the  case,  the  obtained 
probabilistic model would correspond to the same model built for 
the hypothesis space over complete preference profiles. In other 
words, we can show for hk∈H that: 
( ) ( ) ( ) H h h h P h h P h P k
n
i
k
e
j i
n
i
k
w
j i k ∈ ∈ ∈ ← ∏ ∏
= =
,
1
,
1
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It thus is clear that the approach will greatly benefit from the use 
of  partial  domain  knowledge  when  available.  In  that  case,  the 
update of the probability distribution associated with a hypothesis 
would not be based on probabilistic information associated with 
the opponent model but on given domain knowledge. 
5.1  Updating Probabilities of Hypotheses 
Because  the  first  bid  has  maximal  utility  for  a  negotiator 
according to one of the rationality assumptions introduced earlier, 
this bid does not provide any information about an opponent’s 
issue  priorities.  The  first  bid  thus  only  can  be  used  to  update 
probability  distributions  of  hypotheses  about  an  opponent’s 
evaluation  functions  and  the  probability  distributions  of 
hypotheses about weights can be updated only after the agent has 
received more than one bid from an opponent. 
Taking  this  into  account,  the  conditional  distribution 
associated with tactics can be used to update the hypothesis of 
issue k using the expected evaluation values and weights of the 
rest of the issues as defined by the current opponent model. So, 
suppose  we  need  to  update  the  probability  distribution  of  the 
hypothesis for issue k after receiving a bid bt from the opponent. 
In  order  to  do  so,  we  introduce  a  partial  expected  utility 
( ) t k b u > − <  of bid bt that does not take the contribution of issue k 
to the utility of the bid into account, and is defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) ∑
+ − =
> − < ⋅ =
n k k i
t
e
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w
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The probability of the hypotheses over the shape of the evaluation 
function can then be updated according to Bayes’ rule as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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where  w
k h  is the expected value of the weight of issue k. 
The  probability of the hypotheses related to the weight of 
issue k can be updated in a similar way as follows: 
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Because  the  application  of  Bayes’  rule  to  multiple 
hypotheses needs to be implemented as a sequential procedure, 
care should be taken to perform a Bayesian update by using the 
expected utility, weights and evaluation values that are derived 
from the probability distribution before any Bayesian update has 
been performed. Otherwise, any hypotheses that are updated after 
other  hypotheses  have  been  updated  would  be  biased  by  the 
updated probability distributions of these hypotheses that already 
have  been  updated.  Additionally  distributions  of  a  priori 
probabilities have to be adjusted in such a way that the sum of the 
expected values of the weights equals one, i.e.: 
∑
=
=
n
i
w
i h
1
1 
5.2  Experimental Results 
In  this  section,  additional  results  are  presented  to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the scalable learning algorithm 
on  larger  domains.  The  same  experimental  setup  is  used  as  in 
Section  4.1.  However,  a  more  complex  domain  is  used:  the 
AMPO vs. City domain of [11], which consists of 10 issues, 5 
values  in  average  each  (total  of  7,128,000  possible  outcomes). 
The results on this domain presented in Figure 6 show, as is only 
to be expected, that it becomes harder to stay close to the Pareto 
efficient frontier. The performance of the Bayesian learning agents 
337is now similar to that of the agent based on the Trade-Off strategy 
and  both  stay close to the Pareto frontier. The ABMP strategy 
shows  similar  behaviour  as  on  the  earlier  negotiation  domains, 
and is outperformed by the other strategies. The results thus are 
still  very  good.  Also,  note  that  the  agreement  reached  by  the 
Bayesian agents has a higher utility than that reached by the other 
strategies  and  that  both  the  Bayesian  agent  without  domain 
knowledge  as  well  as  the  Trade-off  agent  make  quite  big 
unfortunate steps. 
 
 
Figure 6. Negotiation dynamics for the AMPO vs. City domain.  
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In  this  paper,  an  opponent  modelling  framework  for  bilateral 
multi-issue  negotiation  has  been  presented.  The  main  idea 
proposed here to make opponent modelling in negotiation feasible 
is  to  assume  that  certain  structural  requirements  on  preference 
profiles and on the strategy of an opponent are in place. Due to 
the probabilistic nature of the model, these assumptions still allow 
for a great diversity of potential opponent models. 
The learning approach has been tested on several domains to 
demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  the  approach.  The  results 
moreover showed the effectiveness of using an opponent model in 
a  negotiation  strategy  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  bidding 
process.  In  the  future  work  we  will  analyze  the  quality  of  the 
learned  opponent  modelled  with  respect  to  the  original 
preferences profile of the opponent. We will investigate influence 
of  the  negotiation  domain,  preference  profile,  and  opponent’s 
strategy on the quality of the learning. 
The  learning  approach  does  not  rely  on  prior  knowledge 
about e.g. the domain, but if such knowledge is available it can be 
incorporated and used to initialize probability distributions in the 
opponent model. However, domain knowledge would be useful to 
increase the efficiency of learning a correct opponent model in the 
scalable learning algorithm proposed. 
One interesting line of future research is to test and initialize 
the  learning  algorithm  for  specific  domains  with  an  “average 
preference profile” derived from (large sets) of negotiator profiles 
for that domain. It is expected that performance of the algorithm 
on specific domains can be further enhanced. We are currently 
setting  up  an  experiment  to  collect  preference  profiles  for  a 
negotiation  domain  and  will  test  how  our  learning  algorithm 
performs when it is initialized with such an aggregated profile. 
Another direction for future research concerns the hypothesis 
space used in the opponent modelling framework. Although we 
think the evaluation functions proposed in this paper provide a 
good basis for approximating many preference profiles in practice 
other  choices  of  function  types  might  prove  more  effective  in 
certain domains. 
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